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Section 404: The Nasty Business





Section 404, Clean Water Act, 33 USC Sec. 1344
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers implementing
regulations, 33 C.F.R. Sec. 320 (general policies), 323
(dredge and fill), 329 (waters of the United States)
Environmental Protection Agency implementing
regulations, 40 C.F.R. Secs. 230 (Section 404(b)(I)
guidelines), 231 (404(c) guidelines)
L. Liebesman, "The Role of EPA's Guidelines in the
Clean Water Act Sec. 404 permit program 	 Judicial
Interpretation and Administrative Application," 14 Env.
Law Rep. 10272 (July 1984)
G. Torres, "Wetlands and Agriculture:
Environmental Regulation and the Limits of Private
Property," 34 Kansas Law Review 539 (1986) (cases and
analysis)
Wetlands Symposium, 7 Virginia Journal of Natural
Resources Law 2, Spring 1988
National Wetlands Newsletter, Environmental Law
Institute (current issues, bimonthly)
Outline of remarks
Of all the environmental laws on America's
horizon, Section 404 of the Clean Water Act is,
day in and day out, the most agonizing and the
least susceptible to--in the words of this
conference--"integrating beneficial use and
environmental protection." Every aspect of this
statute is polarized, from its goals to its
requirements to its administration. The result is
conflict, on ever-shifting grounds.
T.	 The Statutory Program
The Corps of Engineers permits "dredge and
fill" activities in "waters of the United States."
Section 404(a). Under EPA guidelines, Section
404(b). And under the shadow of an EPA veto,
Section 404(c). The U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service
join in, Section 404(m) and 16 U.S.C. Sec. 661 et
seq. (Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act). The
states join in, and may indeed opt to run the
program, Section 404(h), but under EPA's eye,
Section 404(i),(j).
Simple, no?
TT. Round One: The Scope of the Program
A. "Waters of the United States." The
courts expand jurisdiction beyond traditionally
navigable waters, to all "waters of the United
2
States." NRDC v. Calloway, 392 F. Supp. 685
(n.o.c. 1975). Congress ratifies this expansive
jurisdiction in its 1977 amendments to the Clean
Water Act, carving out, instead, exemptions for
classes of activities. Sections 404(e), (f). The
courts affirm the expanded jurisdiction, including
"adjacent wetlands" United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes,106 S.Ct. 455 (1985); artificially-
created wetlands, Swanson v. United States, 789
F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1986); and waters "isolated"
from navigable waters, 33 C.F.R. 328.3, and State 
of Utah v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 799 (10th Cir. 1984).
Unresolved conflict: the extent of
isolated waters and their adjacent wetlands.
B. When are you in these waters? The
courts approve a test for determining waters of
the United States based on the prevailing soils,
hydrology and vegetation. Avoyelles Sportsmen's 
League v. Alexander, 511 F. Supp. 278 (W.D.La.
1981) aff'd in part sub. nom. Avoyelles 
Sportsmen's League v. Marsh, 715 F2d 897 (5th Cir.
1983).
Unresolved conflict: how water-
dependent need the vegetation be?
C. And, what do you have to be doing?
Dredge and fill involves any significant movement
of soil. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh,
473 F Supp. 525 (W.D.La. 1979). Recent Corps
regulations exempt the "incidental fallback" from
dredging operations. 51 Fed. Reg. 41210 (Nov. 13,
1986). The exemptions Congress provided in 1977
for normal sylvicultural and agricultural
activities will be narrowly construed. E.g. 
United States v. Akers, 785 F2d. 814 (9th Cir.
1986); United States v. Huebner, 752 F2d. 1235
(7th Cir.). Corps "nationwide" permits exempting
categories of activities, 30 C.F.R. 330, will also
be narrowly construed. Riverside Irrigation 
District v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir.
1985).
Unresolved conflict: What is "normal,"
and what is the role of "intent" in the incidental
filling of wetlands?
III. Round Two: The Permit Decision
A. Scope, again: the NEPA connection.
A threshold problem arises in defining exactly
what is being permitted, and what effects are
included, in the Section 404 decision. The Corps
has recently restricted its National Environmental
Policy Act review of permitted activities. See 53
Fed. Reg. 3120 (Feb. 3, 1988); see also Save the 
Bay, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 610 F2d. 322 (5th
Cir. 1980).
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Unresolved conflict: Will the NEPA
regulations limit 404?
b.	 Alternatives: the heart of the
decision. EPA's 404(b)(1) guidelines forbid
discharges if an alternative is "practicable" and
would be less harmful to aquatic life. 40 C.F.R.
230 (a). They, further, create a presumption
against dredge and fill permits in wetlands
("special aquatic areas") for activities that are
not "water dependent." 40 CFR 230.10(a)(3). This
presumption can be overcome by an applicant upon a
showing that alternatives are not reasonably
available. Id.	 Under Louisiana Wildlife
Federation v. York, 761 F2d. 1044 (5th Cir. 1985),
the applicant's objectives in the project are at
least a limitation on the scope of alternatives
considered. In Bersani v. EPA, 26 E.R.C. 1678
(N.D.N.Y. 1987), however, the fact that an
applicant does not own an alternative (non-
wetland) location does not make that location
"impracticable." All of which guidance makes the
Section 404 decision exquisitely difficult: if
the decision hinges on alternatives--as it does--
how far does this inquiry go?
Unresolved conflict: When is a project
"water-dependent," when is an alternative to it
"practicable"? and...says who?
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C. The balancing factors: harm and 
mitigation. Regulations of both the Corps and EPA
are discretionary as to the amount of harm needed
to deny a permit under Sections 404(a), or 404(c).
This vagueness encourages an applicant to offer
"mitigation" measures in its proposal, to
facilitate permit approval. According to Bersani 
v. EPA, supra, however, EPA may ignore a
mitigation proposal in evaluating the impacts of a
project for purposes of exercising its Section
404(c) review. Whatever the legal status of
mitigation proposals, they remain a major feature
of the 404 process.
Unresolved conflict: the role of
mitigation.
TV. Rounds Three, Four—. Looking ahead,
new conflicts over Section 404 are inevitable, and
will include:
A. "Takings." Under what circumstances
does permit denial constitute a taking of private
property without due process, i.e. requires
compensation. Courts have generally found against
"taking" claims. Deltona Corp. v. United States 
657 F2d. 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1984); 791 F.2d 893 (Cir.
1986). Florida Rock industries, inc. v. United
States, 791 F.2d 893 (Cir. 1986). But see United
6
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, sunra ftns.
4,6..
B. Alternatives, again. Tf
alternative locations are controlling, what about
alternative technologies? See 404(b)(1)
guidelines; c.f. 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1314 (hest
available technology standards for pollution
discharges).
C. Enforcement and penalties. Fines,
injunctions and restoration orders are available.
Although civil penalties now require a jury trial,
United States v. Tull, 107 S.Ct. 1831 (1987), the
1987 Amendments provide for administrative
penalties that may finesse the question.
D. Section 404(c), the sleepina giant.
At some point, in Some fashion, Section 404(c)
will awaken. See Bersani, supra. Then again, it
may go back to sleep.
V.	 Conclusion. There can be no conclusion
to Section 404, so long as there is a strong
public interest in protecting wetlands and a
strong private interest in developing them...i.e.,
ever.
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